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Note*
Dispelling the Constitutional Creation
Myth of Tribal Sovereignty, United
States v. Weaselhead'
Long ago there were no stars, no moon, no sun. There was only darkness
and water. A raft floated on the water, and on the raft sat a turtle. Then from
the sky, a spirit came down and sat on the raft. "Who are you?" asked Turtle.
"Where do you come from?" "I came from above," answered the spirit. "Can you
create some land for us?" asked Turtle. "We need dry land and some people to
live on it."
Creator scraped the earth from under Turtle's nails and rolled it around in
his hand. At first nothing happened. Then the earth began to grow. It en-
larged until it became as big as the world ....
Then the spirit said that something else was needed, and he made people
.... The first man was called Kuksu, and the first woman was called Morning
Star. And by and by there were many people on the earth.
For a long time everyone spoke the same language, but suddenly people be-
gan to speak in different tongues. Kuksu, however, could speak all the lan-
guages, so he called his people together and told them the names of the animals
in their own languages, taught them to get food, and gave them their laws and
rituals. Then he sent each tribe to a different place to live. Then he too left. He
went to the spirit house that was up above.2
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I. INTRODUCTION
Indian and non-Indian interests have collided from first contact.3
Since the adoption of the United States Constitution, courts have
struggled to reconcile society's infringements on indigenous peoples
with democratic notions. 4 Indian tribes were, and continue to be, vul-
nerable to majority interests. 5 Early Supreme Court decisions at-
tempted to affirm a measure of tribal autonomy and institute some
3. See id. 420-32 (discussing the consequences of European invasion); see also John-
son v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (indicating that tribes are sover-
eigns, but the right of occupancy can be diminished by the United States
government, the greater sovereign, by conquest, sale, or treaty).
4. See G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change: 1815-35, in III-
IV THE OLIVER WENDELL HoLmis DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, 740 (Macmillan Publ'g 1988) (comparing the Marshall Court's
treatment of Indians with African Americans, and stating, "[riacial minorities
received a message from the Marshall Court that they were to receive repeatedly
in the subsequent course of American history: liberty and equality in America
have been regularly contingent on whose freedom and whose equal treatment is
at issue"); Martha A. Field, The Seminole Case, Federalism, and the Indian Com-
merce Clause, 29 ARiz. ST. L.J. 3 (1997) (discussing the Court's "remarkable hold-
ing" that the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
Congress from authorizing Indian tribes to sue states in federal courts under the
Indian Gaming and Regulatory Act); see also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515 (1832) (indicating that regulation of relations between the United
States and tribes is the exclusive province of the United States government, and
state laws that interfere with those relations are "repugnant to the Constitution,
laws, and treaties of the United States"); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 1 (1831) (2-2-2 split) (indicating that tribes are not foreign nations for con-
stitutional purposes).
5. See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of
the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1573 (1996) (indicating that
the Court has assumed the job it once conceded to Congress, "considering and
weighing cases to reach results comporting with the Justices' subjective notions
of what the Indian jurisdictional situation ought to be").
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semblance of protection from the dominant white culture. 6 However,
the modern Supreme Court has steadily whittled away many of the
early protective devices. 7 The Court's trend focuses on non-tribal in-
terests in analyzing tribal sovereignty.8
In United States v. Weaselhead,9 the United States District Court
for the District of Nebraska recognized Congress's authority to affirm
tribes' inherent sovereign authority. Initially, the majority of an
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals three-judge panel (the "Panel") re-
versed the district court and gave constitutional weight to Supreme
Court decisions that had diminished tribal sovereignty.' 0 Had the
Panel's majority decision stood, it would have necessarily abrogated
Congress's power to legislate on Indian affairs, and its decision would
have had far-reaching implications for tribal governments and tribal
members. As did the district court, the Panel focused on the source of
tribal sovereignty and the effect of Congress's amendments to the In-
dian Civil Rights Act."1 Subsequently, the Panel's opinion was va-
cated.12 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc and
acting in a per curiam capacity, affirmed the district court's order by a
vote of an equally divided court and without opinion.13
6. See Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883) (interpreting a treaty so as to uphold
tribal jurisdiction and declaring that departure from government's general policy
toward Indians required clear expression of congressional intent); Cherokee Na-
tion, 30 U.S. 1 (stating that states cannot exercise state law over Indian terri-
tory); Johnson, 21 U.S. 543 (indicating that Indians cannot sell lands to states
without congressional approval).
7. See Philip S. Deloria & Nell Jessup Newton, The Criminal Jurisdiction of Tribal
Courts Over Non-Member Indians: An Examination of the Basic Framework of
Inherent Tribal Sovereignty Before and After Duro v. Reina, 38 FED. B. NEws & J.
70, 74 (1991).
8. See Getches, supra note 5, at 1574; see also Field, supra note 4, at 23 (condemning
the Supreme Court for using a tribal case for federalism retrenchment purposes,
stating that "[r]ules involving Native Americans should be the result of decisions
focusing on Native American needs and issues; they should not be the happen-
stance result of a political or legal battle on an altogether different subject").
9. 36 F. Supp. 2d 908 (D. Neb. 1997), rev'd, 156 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 1998) (2-1 deci-
sion), reh'g granted and opinion vacated, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 30874, at *1 (8th
Cir. Dec. 4, 1998), affd by an equally divided Court, 165 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1999)
(en banc) (per curiam) (mem.)(affirming the district court's decision), petition for
cert. filed (Apr. 29, 1999).
10. See Weaselhead, 156 F.3d 818. The Panel majority relied largely upon Oliphant
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 1978) (holding that Indian tribes have
no jurisdiction over non- Indian criminal offenders on tribal lands), and Duro v.
Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (holding that Indian tribes have no jurisdiction over
non-member Indians, or in other words, Indians who do not belong to the tribe
that is asserting jurisdiction).
11. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1994).
12. See Weaselhead, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 30874, at *1.
13. See Weaselhead, 165 F.3d 1209.
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The district court's order and the decisions of the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals sitting as a three-judge panel and, subsequently, en
banc, illustrate the clash between historical precedent, the Constitu-
tion, and pragmatics. This Note analyzes the primary conflicts among
the order of the District Court for the District of Nebraska and the
vacated majority and dissenting opinions of the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals Panel in United States v. Weaselhead. The Note highlights
the tension in logic with which modern Supreme Court analyses of
tribal sovereignty has presented courts, Congress, and tribal govern-
ments. The Note also discusses the potential implications of giving
constitutional weight to Supreme Court decisions that purportedly di-
minished tribal sovereignty.
After providing historical background necessary to place any case
involving federal Indian law into context, the district court's order and
the Panel's majority and dissenting opinions are summarized. Next,
the major areas of disagreement-the source of tribal sovereignty and
the nature of congressional authority over that sovereignty-are ana-
lyzed through a historical perspective. Last, because the Eighth Cir-
cuit did not decisively resolve issues that the various decisions in
Weaselhead raised, the Note discusses the implications the Panel ma-
jority's vacated opinion would have had for future federal Indian legis-
lation and policy, and the practical effects the opinion would have had
on Indian tribes.
II. UNITED STATES V. WEASELHEAD
Under the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause, no person
shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb."'4 Multiple prosecutions violate the Double Jeopardy Clause
of the Fifth Amendment only if the prosecutions are initiated by the
same sovereign.15 Neither a federal nor a state prosecution of the
same person for the same act bars a subsequent prosecution by the
other.16 However, the Fifth Amendment bars successive prosecutions
by only nominally different entities.17 For instance, courts have rea-
soned that territorial courts and federal courts are both "creations em-
14. U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
15. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187
(1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). But cf Waller v. Florida, 397
U.S. 387 (1970) (holding that defendant convicted in a city municipal court could
not be tried by the state on charges based upon the same acts involved in the city
conviction); Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253 (1937) (holding that successive
prosecutions by federal and territorial courts are prohibited).
16. See Abbate, 359 U.S. at 194-95; Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 131.
17. See, e.g., Waller, 397 U.S. at 394-95 (indicating that a state and city within that
state cannot bring successive prosecutions for the same conduct even if state law
treats each as separate sovereigns); Shell Co., 302 U.S. at 264 (holding that suc-
cessive prosecutions by federal and territorial courts are prohibited); Grafton v.
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anating from the same sovereignty" and, therefore, prosecution by one
bars subsequent prosecution by the other.iS
Both the magistrate judge, in his Report and Recommendation to
the District Court,1 9 and the Eighth Circuit Panel majority20 deter-
mined that Congress's definition of Indian tribes' jurisdiction over
non-member Indians,21 subsequent to Supreme Court interpretation
of that jurisdiction, constituted a delegation of congressional power to
tribal governments and not an affirmation of retained sovereignty.
Therefore, the magistrate judge and the Panel majority found that the
Winnebago Tribal Court had merely exercised authority emanating
from the same source of power as that of federal jurisdiction when it
convicted Robert Weaselhead, Jr. Accordingly, they concluded that
the federal indictment of Weaselhead, subsequent to a tribal convic-
tion, should have been dismissed on Fifth Amendment grounds.
In contrast, the district court 2 2 and the Eighth Circuit Panel dis-
sent 23 both concluded that Congress is the final arbiter of the extent of
retained tribal sovereignty. Both asserted that the Supreme Court's
decisions regarding limitations on tribal sovereignty were based on
federal common law. Therefore, both concluded that Congress had
merely affirmed tribes' inherent sovereignty as it relates to criminal
jurisdiction, and that the Winnebago Tribe's jurisdiction did not ema-
nate from the same source as that of the federal government.
A. Facts
Robert Lee Weaselhead, Jr. is an enrolled member of the Blackfeet
Indian Tribe of Montana. In March 1997, Weaselhead was arraigned
in Winnebago Tribal Court on several charges alleged to have been
committed on the Winnebago Reservation, including sexual assault on
a minor child. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Weaselhead pled no con-
test to one count of first degree sexual assault and the remaining
charges were dismissed. The tribal court entered a judgment of con-
United States, 206 U.S. 333, 350 (1907) (holding that acquittal in a federal court-
martial barred retrial in Philippine's territorial court).
18. Shell Co., 302 U.S. at 264.
19. United States v. Weaselhead, 8:97CR45 (D. Neb. Oct. 21, 1997) (Report and Rec-
ommendation of United States Magistrate Thomas D. Thalken) [hereinafter Re-
port and Recommendation].
20. United States v. Weaselhead, 156 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 1998), reh'ggranted and
opinion vacated, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 30874, at *1 (8th Cir. Dec. 4, 1998).
21. Throughout this Note, the terms "non-member Indians" and "non-members" refer
to Indians who are not members of the tribe asserting jurisdiction over their
actions.
22. See United States v. Weaselhead, 36 F. Supp. 2d 908, 915 (D. Neb. 1997), affd on
reh'g en banc by an equally divided Court, 165 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1999) (per
curium) (mem.), petition for cert. filed (Apr. 29, 1999).
23. See Weaselhead, 156 F.3d at 825 (Arnold, J., dissenting).
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viction and sentenced Weaselhead to 280 days in jail, with 100 days of
his sentence suspended. 24
On the same day Weaselhead entered his plea in tribal court, a
federal grand jury indicted him on a charge of engaging in a sexual act
with an Indian female juvenile.2 5 Weaselhead pled not guilty and
moved to dismiss the indictment on grounds of double jeopardy. The
grand jury then returned a superseding indictment, charging three
counts of sexual assault for conduct on separate dates, with conduct
on one of those dates being that upon which the tribal conviction was
based. Weaselhead amended his motion to dismiss to include all
counts of the superseding indictment, again on the grounds of double
jeopardy.
The magistrate judge submitted a Report and Recommendation to
the District Court for the District of Nebraska, suggesting the court
dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds.26 The magistrate
judge based his recommendation on interpretation of prior case law27
and a subsequent congressional amendment to the Indian Civil Rights
Act.2s He concluded that, because the tribal court exercised jurisdic-
tion that emanated from a congressional delegation of power, the Fifth
Amendment barred subsequent prosecution by the federal govern-
ment for the same conduct.
However, the United States District Court for the District of Ne-
braska expressed a contrary view. The government objected to the
magistrate judge's recommendation, asserting that separate sover-
eigns brought the successive prosecutions of Weaselhead.2 9 The dis-
trict court determined that the congressional amendment to the
Indian Civil Rights Act was simply an affirmation and clarification of
tribes' inherent authority to prosecute member and non-member Indi-
ans.30 The district court sustained the government's objection and
thereby denied Weaselhead's amended motion to dismiss the super-
seding indictment.
Weaselhead subsequently appealed the district court's denial of his
amended motion to dismiss to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
24. Sentences imposed by tribal courts are limited by federal statute to a maximum
of one year's imprisonment and a $5000 fine. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1994).
25. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2243 (1994) for a description of the offenses.
26. See Report and Recommendation, supra note 19.
27. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435
U.S. 191 (1978); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
28. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1994); infra note 75 (referring to amendments to the
Indian Civil Rights Act in the aggregate as the "post-Duro" amendments or
revision).
29. See United States v. Weaselhead, 36 F. Supp. 2d 908 (D. Neb. 1997), affd on reh'g
en banc by an equally divided Court, 165 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curium)
(mem.), petition for cert. filed (Apr. 29, 1999).
30. See id. at 915.
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He challenged only that portion of the superseding indictment directly
related to the tribal court conviction. A majority of the Eighth Circuit
Panel reversed the district court's denial.s1 The Panel's opinion was
later vacated 32 and, upon rehearing en banc, an equally divided court
affirmed the district court's order without opinion.3 3
B. Background
From the commencement of our government, Congress has passed acts to reg-
ulate trade and intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations,
respect their rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection
which treaties stipulate. All these acts ... manifestly consider the several
Indian nations as distinct political communities, having territorial bounda-
ries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the
lands within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guaran-
tied by the United States.3 4
During the genesis of federal Indian law, through what has been
dubbed "the Marshall Trilogy,"3 5 the Supreme Court acknowledged
that Indian tribes are sovereigns,3 6 but they are subject to the ulti-
mate jurisdiction and authority of the federal government because
they are "domestic dependent nations."3 7 In addition, the preeminent
authority on federal Indian law indicated that tribal sovereignty is not
a creation of the federal government.38 Therefore, to determine what
31. See United States v. Weaselhead, 156 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 1998), reh'g granted and
opinion vacated, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 30874, at *1 (8th Cir. Dec. 4, 1998).
32. See Weaselhead, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 30874, at *1.
33. See Weaselhead, 165 F.3d 1290.
34. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 556-57 (1832).
35. The "Marshall Trilogy" consists of three decisions written by Chief Justice John
Marshall: Worcester, 31 U.S. 515; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1
(1831) (2-2-2 split decision); and Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543
(1823).
36. See Johnson, 21 U.S. at 545.
37. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17 (two justices indicating that Indian tribes
were domestic dependent nations and therefore their sovereignty was diminished
by definition; two justices indicating that Indian tribes possessed no sovereignty
at all; and two justices viewing tribes as foreign nations and thus possessed all
the sovereignty accompanying that status).
38. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIN LAw 122 (1942). The Hand-
book states:
Perhaps the most basic principle of all Indian law, supported by a host of
decisions... is the principle that those powers which are lawfully vested
in an Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated powers granted by ex-
press acts of Congress, but rather inherent powers of a limited sovereignty
which has never been extinguished. Each Indian tribe begins its rela-
tionship with the Federal Government as a sovereign power .... The
powers of sovereignty have been limited from time to time by special
treaties and laws designed to take from the Indian tribes control of mat-
ters which, in the judgment of Congress, these tribes could no longer be
safely permitted to handle. The statutes of Congress, then, must be ex-
amined to determine the limitations of tribal sovereignty rather than to
[Vol. 78:162
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remains of tribal sovereignty, one must analyze those statutes by
which Congress has expressly limited that sovereignty.39
After Exparte Crow Dog,40 wherein the Court determined that the
federal government had no jurisdiction over a tribal member who had
murdered another tribal member and had been punished by the tribe,
Congress enacted the Major Crimes Act.41 Although Ex parte Crow
Dog may have acted as the ostensible catalyst for enacting this legisla-
tion, the Major Crimes Act was more likely a response to the Bureau
of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the Secretary of the Interior's decade-long
campaign to extend white man's criminal law to the reservation.4 2 In
United States v. Kagama,4 3 the Court rejected the Indian Commerce
Clause44 as the basis for congressional authority and jurisdiction in
crimes perpetrated by Indians upon Indians while on reservations.
However, the Court still upheld the Major Crimes Act on the basis
that the federal government has a duty to protect Indian tribes and,
therefore, the power to protect them.4 5
In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,46 the Court declared that Congress had
the authority to abrogate treaties it had made with tribes. The Court
stated, "[p]lenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has
been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has
always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the
judicial department of the government."4 7
determine its sources or its positive content. What is not expressly lim-
ited remains within the domain of tribal sovereignty.
Id.
39. See id.
40. 109 U.S. 556 (1883) (interpreting treaty so as to allow tribe exclusive jurisdiction
over murder of one tribal member by another tribal member).
41. Ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(1994)). Initially, the Major Crimes Act gave the United States jurisdiction to try
and to punish seven serious crimes, including murder, perpetrated by Indians
against other Indians while on reservations. See id. The Act has since been
amended to include 13 serious crimes. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994).
42. See CASES AND MATERLAS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 157 (David H. Getches et al.
eds., 4th ed. 1998)). The Secretary of the Interior argued:
If offenses of this character cannot be tried in the courts of the United
States, there is no tribunal in which the crime of murder can be pun-
ished .... If the murder is left to be punished according to the old Indian
custom, it becomes the duty of the next of kin to avenge the death of his
relative by either killing the murderer or some one of his kinsmen.
Id. (quoting 1884 SECRETARY Op THE INTERIOR ANN. REP. 9).
43. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
44. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
45. See Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384.
46. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
47. Id. at 565.
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Both Kagama and Lone Wolf emanated from Indian policy derived
from a House of Representatives rider to an Appropriations Act.48
Prior to the adoption of the rider, the Senate and President dominated
Indian policymaking by exercising their treaty powers.4 9 The House,
via the rider, insisted that it be included in Indian policymaking.
Although the Executive branch continued to negotiate treaties with
tribes that were then enacted into laws even after the adoption of the
rider, the Supreme Court gave the House's policy statement a very
broad interpretation in Kagama5 O and Lone Wolf.5 ' The Court inter-
preted the policy statement regarding shared responsibility between
the House and Senate as carrying the broader purpose of subjugating
tribes to the domestic law of the United States, and thus the plenary
power doctrine was born.52 This forced subjugation is what the Court
refers to when it speaks of tribes' "incorporation within the territory of
the United States ... [that] necessarily divested them of some aspects
of the sovereignty which they had previously exercised," or their "de-
pendent status."53 Congress has since implemented numerous poli-
cies and accompanying statutes under the auspices of plenary
power.54
48. See Deloria & Newton, supra note 7, at 74. The rider to the Appropriations Act
stated: "[N]o Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall
be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with
whom the United States may contract by treaty." Id. (quoting Act of Mar. 3,
1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1994))).
49. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
50. See 118 U.S. at 382 ("But, after an experience of a hundred years of the treaty-
making system of government, congress has determined upon a new departure, -
to govern them by acts of congress.").
51. See 187 U.S. at 567-68. The Court stated:
In the view of the legislative power possessed by Congress over treaties
with the Indian and Indian tribal property, we may not specially con-
sider the contentions pressed upon our notice that the signing by the
Indians of the agreement ... was obtained by fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions, and concealment .... since all these matters, in any event, were
solely within the domain of the legislative authority, and its action is
conclusive upon the courts.
Id.
52. See Deloria & Newton, supra note 7, at 74.
53. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); see also Deloria & Newton,
supra note 7, at 74.
54. For instance, Congress allotted and diminished tribal land and opened reserva-
tions to extensive settlement by non-Indians. See Indian General Allotment Act,
ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (or Dawes Act) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§ 331 (1994)). Congress also provided for forced allotment and termination of tri-
bal tenure without Indians' consent. See ch. 17, 30 Stat. 495 (1898) (the Curtis
Act). Congress's assimilationist policies to "civilize" Indians promoted taking In-
dian children from their parents and requiring them to attend "boarding schools,"
and prohibited Indians from engaging in their traditional religious practices. See
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 42, at 184-85. In
1953, the House of Representatives passed HCR 108 and ushered in the Termina-
[Vol. 78:162
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Tribes continue to possess those aspects of sovereignty not with-
drawn by treaty, statute, or implication necessarily resulting from
their dependent status.5 5 In Duro v. Reina, 5 6 the Supreme Court held
that an Indian tribe's retained criminal jurisdiction does not extend to
Indians who are not members of the tribe asserting jurisdiction but
who commit crimes on that tribe's lands. 57 The Court reasoned that
tribal courts' prosecution of non-members is inconsistent with tribes'
dependent status, and could therefore only be bestowed upon tribes
"by delegation from Congress, subject to the constraints of the Consti-
tution."5 s Before Duro, in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,5 9 the
Court held that tribal courts have no jurisdiction over non-Indians be-
cause such jurisdiction is necessarily inconsistent with Indian tribes'
dependent status. 60
In contrast to Duro and Oliphant, in United States v. Wheeler, the
Court found that, despite Congress's plenary authority to legislate for
Indian tribes, tribes are not mere arms of the federal government. 6 1
Because tribal courts and federal courts are arms of separate sover-
eigns, prosecution of a tribal member by the tribal court does not bar
subsequent prosecution of the same offense by a federal court on
double jeopardy grounds.62 Although tribes' powers of self-govern-
ment remain subject to ultimate federal control, the right of Indian
tribes to punish crimes committed by tribal offenders is not a creation
of Congress. Rather it is part of tribes' "primeval sovereignty" that
"has never been taken away from them, either explicitly or implicitly,
tion Era, whereby Indians' federally recognized status was terminated and In-
dian trust land was once again diminished. See id. at 204-19.
55. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323 (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435
U.S. 191 (1978)).
56. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
57. See id. at 688-89. The Duro decision generated abundant and vehement scholarly
criticism. See Deloria & Newton, supra note 7, at 74; Kenneth Factor, Note &
Comment, Tightening the Noose on Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction: Duro v. Reina,
27 TULSA L.J. 225 (1991); Elizabeth A. Harvey, Comment, The Aftermath of Duro
v. Reina. A Congressional Attempt to Reaffirm Tribal Sovereignty Through Crimi-
nal Jurisdiction Over Nonmember Indians, 8 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. (1991); Mar-
garet Wilson, Note, Duro v. Reina: The Last Nail in the Coffin for Indian Tribal
Sovereignty, 1991 UTAH L. REv. 675.
58. Duro, 495 U.S. at 686.
59. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
60. See id. at 195. Although many aspects of this Note may also be relevant to the
Court's holding regarding divestment of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians who
commit crimes on reservations, its scope is limited to retained inherent tribal
sovereignty as it relates to criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians.
61. See 435 U.S. 313, 329-30 (1978).
62. See id. at 330-32.
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and is attributable in no way to any delegation to them of federal
authority."63
In Wheeler, the Court was also concerned about the "undesirable
consequences" that would result from allowing an assertion of double
jeopardy to bar subsequent federal prosecutions. 64 Prosecution by one
sovereign, the tribe, for an offense, the punishment for which is lim-
ited by federal statute,65 could bar the federal government from prose-
cuting a much graver one.6 6 The double jeopardy bar would deprive
the federal government of the right to enforce its laws.6 7 The Court
issued a caveat that, although Congress could address potential
double jeopardy problems by exercising its plenary powers to com-
pletely divest tribes of criminal jurisdiction, "such a fundamental
abridgment of the powers of Indian tribes might be thought as unde-
sirable as the federal pre-emption [sic] of state criminal jurisdiction
that would have avoided conflict in Bartkus and Abbate."68
The precarious status of Indians and Indian tribes has been deter-
mined by statute and federal common law and not by the Constitution.
Until the Citizenship Act of 1924,69 Indians were not subject to the
jurisdiction of the federal courts and, therefore, not protected by the
Constitution.70 In addition, the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 was
63. Id. at 328. Pursuant to federal legislation, the Bureau of Indian Affairs estab-
lished a Code of Indian Tribal Offenses and a Court of Indian Offenses for the
reservation. Also, the Secretary of the Interior had approved the Tribal Code,
and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 and other legislation authorized tribes
to adopt constitutions for self-government. Finally, the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968 made most of the Bill of Rights provisions applicable to Indian tribes and
limited the punishment tribal courts could impose. However, the Court con-
cluded that none of these laws created Indians' power of self-government or their
right to punish tribal offenders. See id. at 327-28.
64. Id. at 330-31. The Court continued:
[The prospect of avoiding more severe federal punishment would surely
motivate a member of a tribe charged with the commission of an offense
to seek to stand trial first in a tribal court. Were the tribal prosecution
held to bar the federal one, important federal interests in the prosecu-
tion of major offenses on Indian reservations would be frustrated.
Id.
65. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1994). At the time of the Wheeler decision, the punish-
ment tribes could impose was limited to six months imprisonment or $500 fine, or
both. In 1986, the statute was amended to allow tribes to impose one-year im-
prisonment and a fine of $5000, or both.
66. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 329-30.
67. See id. at 317-18, 330-31 (citing Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195
(1959)).
68. Id. at 331 (citations omitted).
69. Pub. L. No. 175, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (1924) (current version at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401(b)(1994)) (providing for naturalization of all "Indians born within the ter-
ritorial limits of the United States").
70. See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884) (finding that an Indian man living apart




originally enacted by Congress as a delayed response to the Court's
determination that the Constitution does not protect Indians from the
actions of tribal governments. 71 However, although the Indian Civil
Rights Act was an exercise of Congress's plenary authority to modify
the effects of Talton v. Mayes,72 the Court determined that Congress
did not explicitly provide a federal forum for violations of the Act.73
In response to the perceived jurisdictional void created by Duro,74
71. See Donald L. Burnett, Jr., An Historical Analysis of the 1968 "Indian Civil
Rights"Act, 9 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 557 (1972); see also Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S.
376 (1896). In Talton, the Court stated:
mhe existence of the right in Congress to regulate the manner in which
the local powers of the [tribe] shall be exercised does not render such
local powers federal powers arising from and created by the constitution
of the United States.... [Als the powers of local self-government enjoyed
by the [tribe] existed prior to the constitution, they are not operated
upon by the Fifth Amendment, which... had for its sole object to control
the powers conferred by the constitution on the national government.
Id. at 384.
72. 163 U.S. 376.
73. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978).
74. State courts cannot exercise jurisdiction over any Indians on reservations with-
out tribal consent. See Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. 280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1994), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994)) [herein-
after Public Law 280); the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-284, 82
Stat. 78 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1328 (1994)). The Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged that "[sitate authorities may lack the power, resources, or inclination
to deal with reservation crime. Arizona, for example, specifically disclaims juris-
diction over Indian country crimes." Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 697 (1990) (cit-
ing Amz. CoNsT., art. 20, 1 4); see also Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280
and the Problem of Lawlessness in California Indian Country, 44 UCLA L. REv.
1405, 1419 (1997) (claiming Public Law 280 has created jurisdictional gaps be-
cause in some areas within Indian country, no government has authority, and in
other areas within Indian country, although state governments may have author-
ity in theory, these governments lack "institutional support or incentive" to exer-
cise their authority; and also asserting that when states do exercise their law
enforcement authority "gross abuses of authority are not uncommon").
With regard to federal jurisdiction, the Indian Country Crimes Act, which ap-
plies general federal laws to those crimes committed in Indian country, exempts
non-member Indians from federal jurisdiction if they commit a crime against an-
other Indian in Indian country. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1994) ("This section shall
not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person or property of
another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian country
who has been punished by the local law of the tribe.. . ."). Although Congress
has provided for "exclusive" federal jurisdiction of most felonies committed by one
Indian against another Indian or another Indian's property within Indian coun-
try, see 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994) (the Indian Major Crimes Act), no statute pro-
vides federal jurisdiction of misdemeanors committed by one Indian against
another Indian or another Indian's property within Indian country. Further-
more, many federal prosecutors choose not to assert their jurisdiction in felony
cases in which an Indian has committed one of the named felonies within the
Major Crimes Act against another Indian in Indian country. See Kathleen M.
Neary, Former Winnebago Tribal Judge, Lecture at the University of Nebraska
College of Law Native American Law Seminar (Sept. 22, 1998); see also Tele-
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Congress amended the Indian Civil Rights Act so as to reaffirm tribes'
inherent authority to prosecute non-member Indians.75
C. The Opinions
1. The District Court's Order
The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska
looked to Supreme Court case law and the legislative history of the
post-Duro amendments to analyze Weaselhead's double jeopardy
claim.76 Congress took great pains to demonstrate that it intended
the amendments to be merely a clarification of tribes' status as domes-
tic dependent nations and not a delegation of jurisdiction over non-
member Indians. 77 The court concluded that the post-Duro amend-
ments within
Pub.L. No. 102-137 accord[ ] the judiciary its proper and appropriate scope
while preserving sacrosanct notions of congressional power to set the parame-
phone Interview with the Honorable J. Win. Moreland, Chief Judge of the Omaha
Tribal Court in Macy, Neb. (July 6, 1999) (explaining that federal prosecutors
have refused to prosecute misdemeanors and felonies committed on the Omaha
reservation for several years).
75. See Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646 (1991) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§ 1301(2), 1301(4) (1994)) ("An Act to make permanent the legislative reinstate-
ment, following the decision of Duro against Reina (citation omitted), of the
power of Indian tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over Indians."). In 1990
Congress amended the Indian Civil Rights Act's definition of tribes' "powers of
self-government." The amendment added: "powers of self-government" "means
the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over all Indians[.]" Pub. L. No. 101-511, Title VIII,
§ 8077(b), 104 Stat. 1892 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1994)). An-
other 1990 amendment defined "Indian" as "any person who would be subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States as an Indian under section 1153 of Title 18
[the Major Crimes Act] if that person were to commit an offense listed in that
section in Indian country to which that section applies." Id. At § 8077(c) (codified
as amended at 25 § 1301(4). This Note will refer to these amendments in the
aggregate as the "post-Duro" amendments or revision.
76. The court stated:
Congress perceived the Duro decision as "[rieversing two hundred years
of the exercise by tribes of criminal misdemeanor jurisdiction over all
Indians." The legislative history accompanying Public Law 102-137 af-
firms that "[t]hroughout the history of this country, the Congress has
never questioned the power of tribal courts to exercise misdemeanor ju-
risdiction over non-member Indians in the same manner that such
courts exercise misdemeanor jurisdiction over tribal members."
See United States v. Weaselhead, 36 F. Supp. 2d 908, 915 (D. Neb. 1997) (quoting
S. REP. NO. 102-153, at 2 (1991)) (U.S.S.C.A.N. citation omitted), affd on reh'g
en banc by an equally divided Court, 165 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curium)
(mem.), petition for cert. filed (Apr. 29, 1999).
77. See id. at 913 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 102-61, at 5 (1991), reprinted in 1991




ters of Indian law, within constitutional confines. Here, where Congress is
merely affirming a power that Indian tribes have had from time immemorial,
the court should also defer to Congress.
7 8
The court acknowledged that, had Duro "been predicated upon con-
stitutional grounds, Congress's ability to overturn Duro would be
greatly diminished."79 However, the court determined that the
Supreme Court's reliance on a historical legislative background to
divest tribes of authority to prosecute non-member Indians revealed
that the federal common law was the basis for the Duro decision.80
Having found that the post-Duro amendments affirmed inherent
tribal authority over non-member Indians and that Congress did not
delegate such authority, the court authorized the prosecution of
Weaselhead under federal law. Because the tribe's authority arose
under its inherent sovereignty and not under federal delegation, the
Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar the subsequent prosecution.
2. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals - The Panel's Majority
Opinion
The Eighth Circuit Panel majority in United States v. Weaselhead
held that "the ascertainment of first principles regarding the position
of Indian tribes within our constitutional structure of government is a
matter ultimately entrusted to the Court and thus beyond the scope of
Congress's authority to alter retroactively by legislative fiat."8 1 Siding
with the magistrate judge, the majority based its decision on the se-
ries of Supreme Court decisions that suggested jurisdiction of Indian
tribes over non-members is neither inherent nor sovereign and does
not exist unless Congress affirmatively delegates that power to the
tribe.82 Contrary to the district court's assessment, the Panel major-
ity concluded that those decisions were constitutional interpretations
of limitations on tribal jurisdiction.
Initially, the majority faced the threshold question regarding the
source of a tribe's "'power to punish' nonmembers of the tribe whose
racial status is nonetheless Indian."8 3 The majority emphasized the
Court's position in Duro and Oliphant that "'[c]riminal trial and pun-
ishment is so serious an intrusion on personal liberty that its exercise
over non-Indian citizens was a power necessarily surrendered by the
tribes in their submission to the overriding sovereignty of the United
78. Id. at 915 (footnote omitted).
79. Id. at 913.
80. See id.
81. United States v. Weaselhead, 156 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 1998), reh'ggranted and
opinion vacated, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 30874, at *1 (8th Cir. Dec. 4, 1998).
82. See id. at 822-24 (interpreting South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993);
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990); and Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435
U.S. 191 (1978)).
83. Id. at 821 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978)).
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States.'" 84 Non-member Indians' status with respect to tribal author-
ity was equated to that of non-Indian citizens. The majority reiterated
concerns regarding subjecting non-member Indians to the jurisdiction
of tribal governments in which they have no right to participate.8 5 As
did the Supreme Court in Duro, the Panel majority distinguished a
tribal government's jurisdiction over its members from lack thereof
over non-members, by members' consent via their tribal
membership.8 6
Next, the Panel majority characterized the post-Duro amendments
to the Indian Civil Rights Act as Congress's attempt to "rewrite the
fundamental principles upon which Duro, Oliphant, and Wheeler were
based by redefining the Indian tribes' 'inherent' sovereign status as
having always included criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indi-
ans."8 7 Support for the majority's conclusion was gleaned from Mous-
seaux v. United States Commissioner of Indian Affairs.88 The
majority interpreted dictum in Mousseaux as Congress intending to
create a "legal fiction" that Duro had not been decided.89 The majority
deemed the post-Duro revision of the Indian Civil Rights Act as Con-
gress's attempt to rewrite history to alter the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of how Indian tribes were incorporated into the
constitutional structure. 90 In light of its construction of Congress's ef-
forts, the majority was faced with determining whether the revision
was "simply a non-substantive 'recognition' of inherent rights that In-
dian tribes have always held or whether it [constituted] an affirmative
delegation of power."9 1
Acknowledging that the Supreme Court had not yet interpreted
the effects of Congress's post-Duro revision of the Indian Civil Rights
84. Id. at 822 (quoting Duro, 495 U.S. at 693); see also Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210
("The power of the United States to try and criminally punish is an important
manifestation of the power to restrict personal liberty. By submitting to the over-
riding sovereignty of the United States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily give
up their power to try non-Indian citizens of the United States except in a manner
acceptable to Congress.").
85. See id. at 822-23.
86. See id. (quoting Duro, 495 U.S. at 693).
87. Id. at 823.
88. 806 F. Supp. 1433, 1441-43 (D.S.D. 1992), affd in part and remanded in part on
other grounds, 28 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 1994).
89. See Weaselhead, 156 F.3d at 823 n.4 (construing Mousseaux, 806 F. Supp. at
1441-43). However, one should note that in Mousseaux, the district court re-
ported that Duro "held that, as a matter of federal common law, Indian tribes
lacked inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians." 806 F. Supp. at
1439 (emphasis added). The Mousseaux court further stated that the post-Duro
amendments to the Indian Civil Rights Act "overruled the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Duro." Id. at 1441.




Act, the Panel majority relied92 on South Dakota v. Bourland, a
Supreme Court decision regarding a tribe's authority to regulate hunt-
ing and fishing on Indian land that had been diminished by flood con-
trol acts.9 3 The Panel majority construed Bourland, which was
decided after the amendments to the Indian Civil Rights Act, as an
affirmation of the principle that an Indian tribe's jurisdiction over
non-members of any race is neither inherent nor sovereign and does
not exist without an affirmative congressional delegation of that
power.94
To nullify Congress's stated intent of recognizing and affirming
tribes' inherent power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indi-
ans, the Panel majority then looked to cases interpreting constitu-
tional limitations on congressional authority.9 5 It concluded that
Congress's "sweeping, plenary power to regulate Indian affairs under
the Indian Commerce Clause ... remains subject to constitutional lim-
itations."9 6 Because the majority determined tribal criminal jurisdic-
tion over non-member Indians did not exist prior to the post-Duro
amendments, and despite Congress's power to delegate that jurisdic-
tion to tribes, the majority found that Congress had exceeded its
power when it declared a sovereignty-based jurisdiction existent that
92. See id. (construing South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679(1993)).
93. See 508 U.S. at 694-95. In Bourland the Court stated:
General principles of"inherent sovereignty" also do not enable the Tribe
to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing in the taken area. Although
Indian tribes retain inherent authority to punish members who violate
tribal law, to regulate tribal membership, and to conduct internal tribal
relations, [], the "exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to
protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsis-
tent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive with-
out express congressional delegation.
Id. at 694-95 (citations omitted).
94. See Weaselhead, 156 F.3d at 823 (construing Bourland, 508 U.S. at 694-95). To
substantiate its position, the majority quoted a very contentious footnote from
Bourland:
The dissent's complaint that we give "barely a nod" to the Tribe's inher-
ent sovereignty argument is simply another manifestation of its disa-
greement with Montana .... While the dissent refers to our "myopic
focus" on the Tribe's prior treaty right to "absolute and undisturbed use
and occupation" of the taken area, it shuts both eyes to the reality that
after Montana, tribal sovereignty over non-members "cannot survive
without express congressional delegation," [ I and is therefore not
inherent.
Id. (quoting Bourland, 508 U.S. at 695 n.15 (quoting Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544, 564-65 (1981))).
95. See id. at 824 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (quoting Mar-
bury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))).
96. Id. at 824 n.5 (citing Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,72-73 (1996); Duro v.
Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 712-18 (1987);
Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84-85 (1977); Morton v. Man-
cari, 417 U.S. 535, 553-55 (1974)).
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the Court had already declared to be nonexistent. 9 7 Therefore, the
post-Duro revision of the Indian Civil Rights Act could only constitute
Congress's affirmative delegation ofjurisdiction from itself to tribes.9 8
The Panel majority ultimately concluded that, because the Winne-
bago Tribe's power to punish non-member Indians emanates solely
from authority delegated by Congress, its source of authority is identi-
cal to that of the federal court and, consequently, the dual sovereignty
limitation on double jeopardy was inapplicable.99 Therefore, the
Double Jeopardy Clause barred federal prosecution of Weaselhead for
conduct based on the same factual basis as that of the prior tribal
court conviction.i 0 0
3. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals - The Panel's Dissenting
Opinion
In a succinct dissent, Judge Sheppard Arnold challenged the ma-
jority's conclusion that the Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter of
Indian tribes' inherent sovereign powers and that Congress lacked the
power to legislatively alter the Supreme Court's declarations retroac-
tively.1O1 Judge Arnold found no legal principle in the Constitution or
relevant case law to support the majority's conclusion.1 0 2
The dissent summarily dismissed the majority's reasoning: "In-
deed, it would be difficult to understand how Congress could have no
power over determining the parameters of inherent tribal sovereignty
unless the matter had some constitutional basis. But that is not the
case."10 3 Judge Arnold sought to undermine the majority's reference
to "the position of Indian tribes within our constitutional structure of
government"1 0 4 and its reliance on Marbury v. MadisoniO5 by pointing
out that inherent Indian sovereignty is not defined by the
Constitution.1 0 6
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,1 0 7 a case from the Marshall Trilogy,
substantiated the Panel dissent's conclusion. In Cherokee Nation, to
determine tribes' sovereign status, Chief Justice Marshall looked to
the history of how the country had dealt with Indian tribes, along with





101. See Weaselhead, 156 F.3d at 824-25 (Arnold, J., dissenting).
102. See id. at 825.
103. Id.
104. Id. (quoting the majority opinion, 156 F.3d at 824); see also supra note 90.
105. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see also supra note 95.
106. See Weaselhead, 156 F.3d at 825 (Arnold, J., dissenting).
107. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
108. Jus gentium is defined as:
[Vol. 78:162
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
to the Marshall Court's allusion to treating tribes as states according
to the historical dealings with tribes, the dissent in Weaselhead shed
light on the constitutional void regarding inherent tribal sovereignty.
The dissent concluded, "the question of what powers Indian tribes in-
herently possess, as the district court recognized, has always been a
matter of federal common law."1 0 9
Having resolved the issue of what inherent powers Indian tribes
possess as being a matter of federal common law, the dissent easily
reconciled the effect of the post-Duro revision of the Indian Civil
Rights Act. Because Congress has legislative authority over federal
common law, it has the ultimate power to increase or diminish Indian
tribes' inherent sovereignty.1 1 0 Therefore, the post-Duro revision was
merely Congress's affirmation of tribes' criminal jurisdiction over non-
member Indians as an element of tribes' retained inherent sovereignty
and was not a congressional delegation of power."'i Because the Win-
nebago Tribe's exercise of criminal jurisdiction over Weaselhead ema-
nated from its inherent sovereignty and not from a congressional
delegation of power, under the dual sovereignty doctrine, the Double
Jeopardy Clause should not have barred the federal government's sub-
sequent prosecution.'1 2 The dissent would have affirmed the trial
court "on the basis of its well-reasoned opinion.""i 3
The law of nations. That law which natural reason has established
among all men is equally observed among all nations, and is called the
"law of nations," as being the law which all nations use.... [1]t must not
be understood as equivalent to what we now call "international law," its
scope being much wider. It was originally a system of law, or more prop-
erly equity, gathered by the early Roman lawyers and magistrates... to
be used in cases ... between foreigners or between a Roman citizen and
a foreigner. The principle upon which they proceeded was that any rule
of law which was common to all the nations they knew of must be intrin-
sically consonant to right reason, and therefore fundamentally valid and
just.
BLAcK's LAw DicTioNARY 859-60 (6th ed. 1990).
109. Weaselhead, 156 F.3d at 825 (Arnold, J., dissenting). The dissent also quoted a
recent law review article in support of its conclusion. "'Oliphant and Duro were
not constitutional decisions; they were founded instead on federal common law.'"
Id. (quoting L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Mil-
lennium, 96 COLUm. L. REv. 809, 853 (1996)). The district court also referred to
Gould's quotation. See Weaselhead, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 914 n.15. Other scholars
take the same position. See, e.g. Deloria & Newton, supra note 7, at 72 ("[U]nder
the rubric of federal common law, the Court has begun to impose its own notions
of the role of tribal governments in the United States system .... In other words,
the rules of Oliphant and Duro are not rules of constitutional law.").






III. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF DISAGREEMENTS IN UNITED
STATES V. WEASELHEAD
The gravamen of the disagreement among the various decisions in
United States v. Weaselhead lies in the source of the Winnebago
Tribe's sovereignty as it relates to criminal jurisdiction over the non-
member Indian defendant. The effect of the post-Duro revision of the
Indian Civil Rights Act necessarily follows the respective author's con-
clusion on this essential point.
The Panel dissent, along with the district court, and the Panel ma-
jority, along with the magistrate judge, looked to case law for their
analyses. However, the sharp distinction between the conclusions is
forged by each side's perception of the Supreme Court's basis for its
past decisions. The Panel majority interpreted the Court's allusions
to constitutional concerns as its determination of tribal sovereignty's
position within the constitutional framework and, hence, its determi-
nation of constitutional limitations on congressional authority over In-
dian affairs. The Panel majority's position would have had the effect
of defining tribal sovereignty as a creation of the Court resulting from
its interpretation of the Constitution, as opposed to retained tribal
sovereignty, undefined by the Constitution and not yet divested by
congressional action.
In contrast, the Panel dissent indicated that the Constitution sim-
ply does not address issues of tribal sovereignty. Because there is no
constitutional basis for the Court's analysis of tribal sovereignty, the
dissent concluded the Court's decisions must necessarily be based on
federal common law. Although the Court could divest tribes of sover-
eign powers based on tribes' incorporation within the United States
via interpretation of congressional action and policy, and of prior deci-
sions of the Court, Congress has the power to ultimately determine
which sovereign powers tribes retain. Likewise, the district court
found that the Court based its decisions divesting tribes of sovereign
powers on federal common law and that Congress is the final word on
tribes' retained sovereignty.
This Note will argue that the conclusions of the Panel majority
rested on a fundamental mistaken interpretation of Supreme Court
case law. Contrary to the implicit assumptions within the Panel ma-
jority's holding, inherent Indian sovereignty is not a constitutional in-
novation. Also, for better or worse, as history reveals, Congress's
power over inherent Indian sovereignty is not contained by the Consti-
tution. In decisions of the modern era, the Court has attempted to
reconcile its treatment of non-member Indians with its emphasis of
non-Indian interests over tribal interests. However, it has no consti-
tutional basis for defining the parameters of tribal sovereignty related
to criminal jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court cannot usurp congres-
sional affirmation of retained tribal sovereignty by judicial fiat. The
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Supreme Court's decisions can only be fairly interpreted as resting on
federal common law.
A. The Trilogy
Recently, the Supreme Court determined that early congressional
enactments, unhindered by court action for many years, offer "weighty
evidence" of the lack of constitutional restraints on Congress's
power.114 Although the Panel majority in Weaselhead looked to case
law from the modern era to justify its position on the source of tribal
sovereignty and congressional authority over that sovereignty, one
must reconcile early case law and congressional action with the
Court's later positions. The Panel majority condemned Congress for
attempting to create the "legal fiction that Duro was never de-
cided,"115 yet it ignored foundational case law on the issue of tribal
sovereignty. Judge Arnold pointed to the majority's omission as the
basis for his dissent.
In assessing the foundation of tribal sovereignty, and federal In-
dian law, one will find that tribal sovereignty is based on the "actual
state of things"1 16 rather than any constitutional principle. As the
Court has since indicated in more sophisticated terms, the appropri-
ateness of attributing finality to the political departments' actions and
the lack of criteria for making judicial determinations are dominant
considerations in assessing the Court's ultimate authority.1 17 The
Marshall Trilogy is notable for what it does not say about tribal sover-
eignty, particularly its lack of constitutional reference, as much as for
what it does say. However, the Marshall Court made numerous state-
ments that revealed its perception of tribal sovereignty and the
Court's inability to define tribes' preexisting sovereignty.
In Johnson v. M'Intosh, the Court determined that, based on its
supreme sovereignty, the United States had the right to extinguish
Indian title of occupancy by treaty or conquest."18 Consequently, the
government had the authority to invalidate titles and land invest-
ments of those to whom Indians and Indian tribes had conveyed land.
Without alluding to constitutional principles, the Court stated that
"discovery gave ... [the United States government] a right to such a
degree of sovereignty, as the circumstances of the people would allow
them to exercise."'1 9 Perhaps even more telling of the extent of con-
114. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2370 (1997) (quoting Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723-724 (1986)).
115. Weaselhead, 156 F.3d at 823 & n.4.
116. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 543, 546, 560 (1832); Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 591 (1823).
117. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939).
118. See 21 U.S. 543.
119. Id. at 587.
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gressional discretion over tribal sovereignty and the Court's lack of
authority over that power is the following passage: "Conquest gives a
title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny, whatever the pri-
vate and speculative opinions of individuals may be .... The British
government ... whose rights have passed to the United States, ....
asserted also a limited sovereignty over [Indian tribes] . . "120
Although the Court was directly addressing land title rights, it did not
ground Congress's power over tribal rights, nor tribal sovereignty's
status, in the Constitution.
Principles on which the Court could rely for its determination of
congressional power were ostensibly lacking. Although it recognized
humanity's "general rule," that conquered peoples should maintain
those inherent rights which they are capable of possessing as a dis-
tinct people,121 based on Eurocentric perceptions, the Court felt that
"[t]he resort to some new and different rule, better adapted to the ac-
tual state of things, was unavoidable."12 2 While the Court seemed
perplexed by the logic of converting the discovery of land inhabited by
Indians into conquest, pragmatics of the nation's reliance on the gov-
ernment's acquisition by discovery demanded that the pretense be
sustained. The Court stated:
[Ilt becomes the law of the land, and cannot be questioned. So, too, with re-
spect to the concomitant principle, that the Indian inhabitants are to be con-
sidered merely as occupants, to be protected, indeed, while in peace, in the
possession of their lands, but to be deemed incapable of transferring the abso-
lute title to others. However this restriction may be opposed to natural right,
and to the usages of civilized nations, yet, if it be indispensable to that system
under which the country has been settled, and be adapted to the actual condi-
tion of the two people, it may, perhaps be supported by reason, and certainly
cannot be rejected by courts of justice. 12 3
The Court reasoned that United States courts lacked the authority
to protect title within Indian territory because those who purchased
land from Indians in their territory took the property subject to tribal
laws. 124 No federal court would have the power to set such convey-
ances aside but would only have power to enforce conveyances after
the United States had acted to take possession of tribal lands.
Although Indians could transfer title, they could only transfer that
which could be enforced in their own tribunals, or they could transfer
title to the United States. Therefore, for title to be good, it had to be
obtained from the United States because, as the supreme sovereign,
the United States had the sole power to divest tribal title and had
120. Id. at 588.
121. See id. at 589.
122. Id. at 591.
123. Id. at 591-92.
124. See id. at 593.
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itself made conveyances of Indian lands previously conveyed by Indian
tribes.
Although Johnson does not address inherent sovereignty as it re-
lates to tribes' criminal jurisdiction over non-members, the Court's re-
sort to natural law principles, the doctrine of discovery, and federal
statutes demonstrates lack of constitutional instruction on inherent
sovereignty in general. The recognized right of tribes to sell their land
to anyone they chose, subject to their own rules, but with all sales
ultimately subject to the authority of Congress, suggests that the
Court could not interfere with tribal jurisdiction nor Congress's au-
thority over tribes.
Had the Johnson Court adopted the position of the Panel majority
in Weaselhead, the federal government would have been constrained
by the Panel majority's constitutional notions. Although at the time of
Johnson the Court had not yet begun to stake out Fifth Amendment
substantive due process protections,1 25 courts today would be forced to
consider the constitutional implications for those who had been
divested of title received from Indians. If Johnson were plucked from
history and placed within the context of the Panel majority's analysis,
such considerations would make the United States government ac-
countable for its numerous conveyances of land that Indians had pre-
viously conveyed directly to non-government purchasers. Although
perhaps yielding a more just result, the outcome would create the up-
roar the Marshall Court sought to avoid by deferring to the actual
state of things.
In Johnson, the Court recognized inherent tribal sovereignty; how-
ever, the issue of the extent of self-government retained by the Indi-
ans was not resolved. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the Court found
that the Cherokee Nation was not a "foreign nation" within the mean-
ing of Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution.i 26 Therefore, the
Court had no original jurisdiction to entertain the Cherokee Nation's
efforts to restrain Georgia from seizing land guaranteed to the Nation
in violation of federal treaties.
As the Panel dissent in Weaselhead highlighted, in Cherokee Na-
tion the Court implied that tribes' retained sovereign status was to be
determined by the history of how the United States had dealt with
tribes and not by their constitutional status. Although the Cherokee
125. See generally Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18
How.) 272 (1856) (analyzing Fifth Amendment due process rights with regard to
deprivation of property of public debtors, but upholding congressional enactment
to so deprive debtors).
126. See 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (2-2-2 decision) (two justices indicating that Indian
tribes are domestic dependent nations and therefore their sovereignty was dimin-
ished by definition; two justices indicating that Indian tribes possessed no sover-
eignty at all; and two justices viewing tribes as foreign nations and thus
possessed all the sovereignty accompanying that status).
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Nation was not found to be a state or foreign state for purposes of
granting the Court original jurisdiction under the Constitution, the
Court acknowledged that "[t]he acts of our government plainly recog-
nize the Cherokee nation as a state, and the courts are bound by those
acts."12 7 The Court thereby implied that, if the tribe had fallen within
the auspices of the Constitution, as a state or foreign state, the Court
would have protected the Cherokee Nation's retained sovereignty to
the extent consistent with the government's acts, not according to con-
stitutional proscriptions. Yet because it could find no placeholder for
tribes within the Constitution, the Court found itself helpless to pro-
tect them.
Analogizing the tribe's status to that of a state carries connotations
of allowing the tribe to invoke all those governmental functions associ-
ated with state sovereignty-those related to safety, health, morals,
and general welfare. To the degree the federal government treated
tribes as states, just as a state had the ability to assert criminal juris-
diction over violators of state law, the tribe would have likewise had
the authority to assert its jurisdiction. Specifically, the Court stated:
They have been uniformly treated as a state from the settlement of our coun-
try. The numerous treaties made with them by the United States recognize
them as a people capable . . . of being responsible . . . for any aggression
committed on the citizens of the United States by any individual of their
community.1 2 8
"Community" is defined as "a group of people who reside in a specific
locality, share government, and often have a common cultural and his-
torical heritage."129 In Cherokee Nation, the Court did not distinguish
Indian communities from tribes. Contrary to the assertion of the
Panel majority in Weaselhead, this lack of distinction indicates that
Indian jurisdiction was not determined by tribal membership.
However, the Court distinguished Indians' relationship with the
United States from all others in that they were considered "domestic
dependent nations."' 3 0 According to Chief Justice Marshall, "[t]heir
relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian"
because "[tihey look to our government for protection; rely upon its
kindness and its power; [and] appeal to it for relief to their wants
.... "131 One should also note that the Cherokee Nation was referred
to as a country.132 In looking to the Constitution for guidance, the
Marshall faction of the Court concluded that, because where the fram-
ers had addressed Indians' relations with the United States, they had
127. Id. at 16.
128. Id. (emphasis added).
129. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DIcTIoNARY 275 (Robert B. Costello, ed.
1992).





done so explicitly, the framers' lack of specific delineation of Indians
within Article III of the Constitution demonstrated their intent not to
include them.' 3 3 Similarly, the Constitution does not delineate Indi-
ans' sovereign status as it relates to tribes' criminal jurisdiction. The
logic of Cherokee Nation reinforces the proposition that tribal sover-
eignty is not a creature of the Constitution.
In the third opinion of the Marshall Trilogy, Worcester v. Georgia,
the Court determined that, through a treaty with the United States
government, the Cherokee Nation had not ceded one of the most im-
portant aspects of managing its affairs: "security against intruders on
[their lands]."134 One commentator pointed out that Chief Justice
Marshall "use[d] the opportunity to clarify that the implicit limits on
tribal sovereignty discussed in his Cherokee Nation opinion relate[d]
to land conveyance rights, not to self-government. 13 5 The Court's
conclusion again insinuated that tribes retained important aspects of
their sovereignty by virtue of what they held prior to the United
States government's intervention, and that those aspects were not cre-
ated by federal action. The Court indicated that the Constitution
eliminated any former constraints the Articles of Confederation may
have imposed on Congress's authority to regulate relations with the
Indians.13 6 The power to make war and peace, enter into treaties, and
regulate commerce with Indian tribes demonstrated that Congress
was "not limited by any restrictions on their free actions."137 Yet
neither the Constitution nor the Articles of Confederation addressed
or created tribal sovereignty. If the Court can speak to any of Con-
gress's powers over Indian affairs on a constitutional basis, it may
only do so in reference to congressional action taken pursuant to the
Indian Commerce Clause. However, the Court is not the ultimate au-
thority over that which Congress does not take from, or returns to,
tribes pursuant to Congress's political relationship with tribes.
133. See id. at 18. The Court stated:
But we think that in construing them, considerable aid is furnished by
that clause in the eighth section of the third article; which empowers
congress to "regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the sev-
eral states, and with the Indian tribes."
... When forming this article, the convention considered them as en-
tirely distinct. We cannot assume that the distinction was lost in fram-
ing a subsequent article, unless there be something in its language to
authorize the assumption.
Id. (reconciling the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution's Commerce
Clause, and interpreting the Commerce Clause's distinction between the states,
foreign nations, and tribes).
134. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 554 (1832).
135. CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 42, at 124.
136. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559.
137. See id; see also U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (regulation of commerce); art. II, § 2,
cl. 2 (treaty-making power); art. VI, cl. 2 (circumscribing states' authority in ref-
erence to federal treaties).
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Although the Worcester Court made reference to the Constitution,
it ultimately looked only to see what authority Congress had not taken
by treaty.138 The Court again referred to those powers the United
States gained and tribes lost due to war and conquest.' 39 However,
apart from legislative enactments pursuant to the enumerated pow-
ers, only those branches with whom the war powers lie should decide
what aspects of sovereignty they take and return.140 Rather than del-
egating the power to punish non-Indians to the Cherokee Nation, the
treaty the Court construed did not extend protections of the United
States government to its citizens who invaded Indian territory.141
The Court reiterated the position it took in Cherokee Nation, high-
lighted by the Panel dissent in Weaselhead, when it referred to Con-
gress's positive acts as implying that the United States "considered
the Cherokees as a nation."142 Similarly, the post-Duro revision of the
Indian Civil Rights Act demonstrated the light in which the United
States considers tribes. The revision constituted Congress's affirma-
tion of Indian tribes' retained inherent sovereignty as it relates to ju-
risdiction over non-member Indians. Although in later opinions, the
Court attempted to distinguish members from non-members in cir-
cumscribing tribes' retained right to self-government,143 in Worcester,
the Court clearly considered the tribe's right to protect itself from in-
138. See 31 U.S. at 559. The Court stated:
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent
political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the un-
disputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single
exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them
from intercourse with any other European potentate than the first dis-
coverer of the coast of the particular region claimed: and this was a re-
striction which those European potentates imposed on themselves, as
well as on the Indians. The very term "nation," so generally applied to
them, means "a people distinct from others." The constitution, by declar-
ing treaties already made, as well as those to be made, to be the supreme
law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with
the Indian nations, and consequently admits their rank among those
powers who are capable of making treaties. The words "treaty" and "na-
tion" are words of our own language .... We have applied them to Indi-
ans as we have applied them to the other nations of the earth. They are
applied to all in the same sense.
Id.
139. See id. at 543.
140. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (indicating political acts
are never examinable by the courts).
141. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 553 (construing the Hopewell Treaty). But see Oliphant
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 197-98 (1978) (construing treaty provi-
sions as a "request for affirmative congressional authority" and therefore incon-
sistent with the contention that criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians was an
aspect of inherent tribal sovereignty).
142. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 553.
143. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990).
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truders, not as an authorization by the United States government, but
as an aspect of retained self-government.144
B. Plenary Powers and Consequences of Allotment
Lack of constitutional guidance on Indian sovereignty again sur-
faced in United States v. Kagama.14 5 The Court found that basing
Congress's authority to establish the Major Crimes Act on the Indian
Commerce Clause would be a "very strained construction" of the
Clause.146 The Court could find no place in the Constitution that gave
Congress the authority to punish Indians who committed crimes
against other Indians on the reservation.14 7 Yet the Court deter-
mined that it was "within the competency of [Clongress" to do so based
on Congress's duty to protect the Indians emanating from its trust re-
lationship.148 The power of Congress to protect Indians was "neces-
sary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom
they dwell."'149 The Court concluded that the power must exist in
Congress because Indian tribes resided within the geographical
boundaries of the United States, and because the power had "never...
existed anywhere else... [and had] never been denied."150
Although the Panel majority in Weaselhead rested its decision on
its conclusion that the Court had determined tribes' constitutional sta-
tus,151 the lack of constitutional guidance is what gave rise to the ple-
nary powers doctrine. Also, as Kagama illustrates, Congress's duty to
protect tribes is extra-constitutional. Therefore, Congress's affirma-
tion of tribes' criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians via the
post-Duro revision of the Indian Civil Rights Act is entirely consistent
with its extra-constitutional duty. Contrary to the Weaselhead Panel
majority's contention that Congress could only delegate its own au-
thority in the area of criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians
144. See 31 U.S. at 561. The Court stated:
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its
own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of
Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no
right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in
conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress.
Id.
145. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
146. Id. at 378-79.
147. Id. at 379-80. Notably, the Court did not distinguish between members and non-
members. It stated that the effect of the Major Crimes Act was "confined to the
acts of an Indian of some tribe, of a criminal character, committed within the
limits of the reservation." Id. at 383.
148. Id. at 383-84.
149. Id. at 384.
150. Id. at 384-85.
151. See United States v. Weaselhead, 156 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 1998), reh'g granted
and opinion vacated, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 30874, at *1 (8th Cir. Dec. 4, 1998).
1999]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
subject to constitutional restraints, Congress's authority can only
arise from its power not subject to the limitations of the Constitution.
The lack of constitutional instruction on inherent tribal sover-
eignty has been the cardinal source of tribes' vulnerability. The un-
checked plenary powers doctrine enabled the United States
government, through its allotment policy, to diminish tribal land hold-
ings that had been guaranteed to tribes by treatiesi 52 from
138,000,000 acres in 1887, to 48,000,000 acres in 1934, with nearly
half of the remaining lands being desert or semi-desert.1 5 3 This
diminishment by acts of Congress is what ultimately gave rise to the
decisions the Weaselhead Panel majority used to corroborate its posi-
tion on diminishment of tribes' retained inherent sovereignty.1 5 4 It is
significant that allotment was a congressional policy and that the
Court recognized Congress's complete, unconstrained authority to
carry out its policy. In Lone Wolf, the Court explicitly declared that
"[p]lenary authority over tribal relations of the Indians has been exer-
cised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been
deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial de-
partment of the government."1 55 The Court's explicit recognition of
Congress's unchecked powers, used for many devastating actions to-
ward tribes, is further evidence of the lack of constitutional basis for
tribal sovereignty, and therefore, the Court's lack of ability to consti-
tutionally determine what inherent sovereignty tribes retain.
The modern Court has attempted to distinguish tribal members
from non-members by the former's consent to tribal membership and,
consequently, to their tribes' criminal jurisdiction.1 5 6 However, in
152. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (holding that Congress could
abrogate treaties with tribes because legislative power over treaties with the In-
dians was solely within the legislative domain and, therefore, Congress's action
was conclusive upon the courts).
153. See The Purposes and Operation of the Wheeler-Howard Indian Rights Bill:
Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the Senate and House Comms. on Indian Affairs,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1934) (memorandum of John Collier, Commissioner, Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs).
154. See Weaselhead, 156 F.3d at 623 (citing South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679,
694-95 (1993) and Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981)); see also
Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1 (1995) (analyzing
the continuing influence of the repudiated allotment policy in cases such as South
Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993), Montana, 450 U.S. 544, and Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)).
155. 187 U.S. at 565.
156. See Duro, 495 U.S. at 694. However, this premise defies logic in light of congres-
sional involvement in defining tribal membership. See M. Annette Jaimes, Fed-
eral Indian Identification Policy: A Usurpation of Indigenous Sovereignty in
North America, 16 PoL'Y SUn. J. 4 (1988), reprinted in NATIVE AMEiucAN SovER-
EIGNTI 204 (J.R. Wunder ed., Garlund Publ'g 1996) (indicating that, despite the
nearly universal practice of entitling a sovereign to determine its own "criteria by
which its citizenry, or 'membership,' is to be recognized by other sovereign na-
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Lone Wolf the Court considered tribal members' lack of consent to con-
gressional action to be of no consequence because tribal sovereignty
had no constitutional basis and congressional policy had no constitu-
tional limitations.157 Members could not have avoided congressional
action by declaring they were no longer tribal members because as
Congress allotted tribal land, it simultaneously declared when Indi-
ans as individuals would be eligible to control their allotted land.158
Congress long ago repudiated its former allotment and correspond-
ing assimilation policiesl5 9 and has since adopted a self-determination
policy toward tribes.160 However, the Court has fixated on the repudi-
ated allotment policy based on the effects of the policy: diminishment
of the tribal land base.161 In Montana, the Court construed the Gen-
eral Allotment Act of 1887, along with treaties that reduced the size of
a reservation, to have divested the Crow Tribe of its jurisdiction to
regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on Indian territory held by
non-Indians in fee. 162 However, the Court created two exceptions to
its general holding. First, tribes retain the inherent power to regulate
activities of non-Indians who enter into consensual business dealings
with tribes. Second, tribes retain inherent civil authority over non-
Indians whose conduct on lands held in fee within reservation bounda-
ries "threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
tions..... federal policy-makers have increasingly imposed Indian identification
standards' of their own devising").
157. See 187 U.S. at 567-68.
158. See History of the Allotment Policy, Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the House
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) (report of Delos Sacket Otis).
159. See Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461 (ending the policy of
allotment), 464 (prohibiting transfer of Indian land or tribal corporate shares ex-
cept to the tribe), 470 (establishing system for making loans to tribes for economic
development), 476 (providing for tribal self-government), 477 (providing for char-
ters of incorporation for tribes), and 478 (providing for the Indian Reorganization
Act not to apply to reservations wherein a majority of adult Indians voted against
its application)(1994); see also Haijo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1129 (D.D.C.
1976) ("Congress had declined to terminate the tribal existence or dissolve the
tribal governments, despite all of its earlier intentions to do so .... ").
160. See Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 450a-n; see also PRESIDENT RICHARD M. NIXON, MESSAGE FROi THE PRESIDENT
OF Tm UNITED STATES TRANsrITING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDIAN POLICY,
H.R. Doc. No. 91-363 (2d Sess. 1970).
161. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); see also Royster, supra note
154, at 53 ("A majority of the justices believed that the ultimate aim of the dis-
credited allotment policy, the destruction of the tribes, should continue to control
tribal authority decades after the allotment program was terminated."). Also, not
only has the Court continued to rely on the allotment policy to analyze those
cases where land was divested by the General Allotment Act, but it has used the
same rationale to apply to cases involving entirely different statutes. See id. at
59.
162. See 450 U.S. at 558-59.
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economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."1 63 The Court
had no constitutional basis for its determination but relied solely on
congressional enactments and policy, along with its own judicially cre-
ated "general principles" that "Indian tribes cannot exercise power in-
consistent with their diminished status as sovereigns."16'i4 One should
note, however, that those principles were based on early case law that
did not rely on constitutional interpretation.
Although the Panel majority in Weaselhead relied on a contemptu-
ous footnote from the Bourland decision as affirmation of the principle
that "tribal sovereignty over nonmembers 'cannot survive without ex-
press congressional delegation,"1 65 the Court's comment in Bourland
was not based on any constitutional foundation. The Bourland deci-
sion, including the footnote, was merely another construction of a con-
gressional enactment along with application of allotment policy
rationale.i66 Just as the Court had no constitutional authority to
limit Congress's actions in implementing allotment policy or other det-
rimental enactments,1 6 7 it has no constitutional authority to limit
Congress's explanation or revision of those enactments. Contrary to
the Weaselhead Panel majority's primary assumption, for the Court to
hold otherwise would create a glaringly unprincipled double standard.
The Court would have declared itself constitutionally powerless to
limit Congress's devastation to tribes, but would assume the role of
the supreme impediment to Congress rectifying its extra-constitu-
tional past deeds. In addition, the Bourland Court only addressed
tribes' inherent sovereignty as it related to its civil regulatory jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians.168 Therefore, its statement cannot serve as an
implicit negation of the post-Duro amendments to the Indian Civil
Rights Act, which explicitly addresses tribes' criminal jurisdiction
over non-member Indians.
C. Implicit Divestiture
In the same vein, the Court's interpretation of tribes' dependent
status as having implicitly divested tribes of criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians169 and non-member Indians1 7 0 is only another interpre-
tation of early case law and congressional enactments, neither being
163. See id. at 566.
164. Id. at 565.
165. See United States v. Weaselhead, 156 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting
South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 695 n.15 (1993)), reh'g granted and
opinion vacated, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 30874, at *1 (8th Cir. Dec. 4, 1998).
166. See 508 U.S. at 694-95 & n.15 (construing H.R. REP. No. 2484 (2d Sess. 1954)
(House Report on the Cheyenne River Act) and Montana, 450 U.S. at 564).
167. See Lone Wolfv. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
168. See 508 U.S. at 694-95.
169. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208-11 (1978).
170. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 701 (1990).
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grounded in constitutional principles. Although the Panel majority in
Weaselhead was concerned with the post-Duro revision of the Indian
Civil Rights Act only creating a fiction, implicit divestiture is a judicial
fiction emanating from the Marshall Trilogy and its deference to the
"actual state of things." Again, because the Constitution did not ad-
dress tribes' retained inherent sovereignty, and based on a law of na-
tions concept that the conquered was still entitled to retain certain
aspects of its sovereignty subject to the wishes of the conqueror, the
Marshall Court contrived the fiction of implicit divestiture in order to
protect conveyances made by the United States government that In-
dian tribes had previously conveyed.' 7 ' Yet implicit divestiture still
has no more constitutional basis in the modern era than it did in the
Marshall era.
In Oliphant, the Court relied on treaty provisions, congressional
policy and enactments, and examination of its earlier precedents to
determine that, absent Congress's affirmative delegation, Indian
tribes do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians because such
power is "'inconsistent with their status.'" 72 However, the Court was
simply interpreting Congress's repudiation of its former allotment and
assimilation policies. To undo the effects of these policies, Congress
enacted the Indian Reorganization Act, under which tribal govern-
ments, courts, and constitutions were established.173 Congress's
treaty and war powers, as they relate to Congress's relationship with
tribes, are not subject to constitutional scrutiny because the Court has
considered those powers political. The Court even went so far as to
allow a House policy statement intrude into the treaty making powers
of the Senate and Executive.' 7 4 Congressional actions that provide
fodder for judicial interpretation are rooted either in Congress's extra-
constitutional plenary powers or its authority under the Indian Com-
merce Clause, which does not address tribes' criminal jurisdiction.
Therefore, the Court's earlier precedents necessarily rested either on
its interpretation of constitutionally unconstrained congressional ac-
tions or the line of cases based on the extra-constitutional fiction born
of the Marshall Trilogy.
Giving the Court the benefit of the assumption that it may not
have reached the issue of tribes' inherent criminal jurisdiction over
non-member Indians earlier in its history, the source of tribal sover-
eignty and the extent of its own authority over that sovereignty were
issues certainly determined in the cradle of federal Indian law and
reaffirmed many times since. As case law, including Oliphant, and
171. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
172. 435 U.S. at 208 (quoting Oliphant v. Schie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (1976)).
173. See ch. 576, § 16, 48 Stat. 987 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 476
(1994)).
174. See Deloria & Newton, supra note 7, at 74.
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congressional enactments demonstrate, there has been no constitu-
tional basis for defining tribal sovereignty or congressional authority
over tribal sovereignty. On numerous occasions, the Court has upheld
congressional enactments subsequent to its prior denial of congres-
sional authority.175
The Oliphant Court perfunctorily reviewed treaties, legislation,
and case law. Subsequently, it made a seemingly arbitrary determi-
nation that Indian tribes' power to try non-Indian offenders without
the "careful proceedings" Congress had extended to non-Indian offend-
ers within Indian country via the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790,
"would belie the tribes' forfeiture of full sovereignty in return for the
protection of the United States."1 7 6 The Oliphant Court interpreted a
congressional enactment stemming from Congress's powers under the
Indian Commerce Clause. However, congressional authority to regu-
late tribes' criminal jurisdiction does not flow from the Indian Com-
merce Clause. i 77
In Oliphant, the Court attempted to redefine its role as the inter-
preter of what Congress had taken away from tribal sovereignty to
include independently defining that sovereignty with which tribes be-
gan. In essence, the Court tried to create its own vision of inherent
tribal sovereignty and force Congress to legislate affirmatively to con-
tradict it, as opposed to Congress legislating to divest inherent sover-
eignty.i78 The Court stated that "[by submitting to the overriding
sovereignty of the United States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily
give up their power to try non-Indian citizens of the United States
except in a manner acceptable to Congress."179
The Oliphant Court's rationale is circular at best. The Court had
previously determined that the relationship between the tribes and
the federal government was a trust relationship. Thereby, the Court
allowed Congress to legislate to protect tribes when Congress deemed
tribes' own protective devices insufficient, despite no constitutional
175. Compare Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883) (denying the federal govern-
ment criminal jurisdiction on tribal lands), with United States v. Kagama, 118
U.S. 375 (1886) (upholding the Major Crimes Act); California v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (denying state intrusion into Indian gaming
operations through Public Law 280), with Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44 (1996) (upholding state intrusion into Indian gaming under through
the Indian Gaming and Regulatory Act).
176. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211.
177. See Kagama, 118 U.S. at 378-79.
178. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212. But see id. at 212 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("In
the absence of affirmative withdrawal by treaty or statute, I am of the view that
Indian tribes enjoy as a necessary aspect of their retained sovereignty the right to
try and punish all persons who commit offenses against tribal law within the
reservation.").
179. Id. at 210.
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authority for Congress to do so.18 0 Yet the Oliphant Court seemed to
require Congress to legislate in order to protect tribal citizens in a way
acceptable to Congress, despite Congress having not divested tribes of
the authority to protect themselves. However, Congress's authority to
legislate to protect tribes from non-Indian criminal offenders would
necessarily rest on its extra-constitutional plenary powers borne of its
trust responsibility to protect tribes.
In Duro, the Court extended its implicit divestiture concept recog-
nized in Oliphant to exclude tribal jurisdiction over non-member Indi-
ans who commit crimes on reservations. In part, the Duro Court
relied on Montana.'8 ' As previously noted, Montana was an interpre-
tation of early treaties and Congress's repudiated allotment policy.
Courts ought to look to "the prior state of the law, including judicial
decisions applicable to the subject of the legislation in question" to in-
struct their interpretation of legislative enactments. 8 2 As a general
principle, when legislating subsequent to judicial interpretation, Con-
gress should enjoy the benefit of relying on the Court's prior deci-
sions.1 8 3 When Congress enacted the General Allotment Act shortly
after Lone Wolf, it did so under the pall of the Court's assertion that
the Court had no authority to constitutionally scrutinize congressional
action in Indian affairs. To give constitutional weight to decisions em-
anating from the Court's interpretation of early treaties and allotment
policy,' 8 4 in contradiction to the Court's earlier position, would allow
prior Congresses, reacting to eras of very different "actual state[s] of
things," to bind all Congresses thereafter. One would have to question
the Court's ability to magically extract a tribal sovereignty nativity
from the Constitution via the implicit divestiture fiction more than a
century after the Court contrived that fiction.
D. Comments on the Constitution
The Panel majority in Weaselhead relied heavily on references to
constitutionally significant distinctions between tribal members and
non-member Indians.'85 However, the Supreme Court's references to
constitutional considerations do not have the effect of divesting Con-
gress of its fiduciary responsibilities. Nor do the references place in-
180. See Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384.
181. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 687 (1990) (construing Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981)).
182. 2A Noamm J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CoNsmuCTIoN § 48.04, at 324-25
(5th ed. 1992).
183. See id. § 45.12, at 62-63.
184. See Duro, 495 U.S. 676; Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191
(1978).
185. But see United States v. Weaselhead, 156 F.3d 818, 821-23 (8th Cir. 1998), reh'g




herent tribal sovereignty "within our constitutional structure of
government . . .ultimately entrusted to the Court ... ."186 In Oli-
phant, the Court indicated that through submission to protections of
the United States government, Indians gave up their authority to try
non-Indian citizens "except in a manner acceptable to Congress."1 8 7
As history demonstrates, the Court has no constitutional reference for
its implicit divestiture fiction. Also, presumably, Congress's post-
Duro affirmation of tribes' retained authority to prosecute non-mem-
bers merely recognizes that tribal prosecutions of non-members, sub-
ject to the Indian Civil Rights Act, are conducted in a "manner
acceptable to Congress."
In Duro, because the Court was concerned with intrusions on non-
member Indians' personal liberties, it extended Oliphant by indicating
that tribes could assert criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians
if that jurisdiction was delegated to tribes by Congress, subject to con-
stitutional limitations.1 8 8 However, as Kagama illustrates, Congress
could only delegate power pertaining to criminal jurisdiction pursuant
to its extra-constitutional plenary power. Also, because Congress is
the political authority over Indian affairs and has the duty to protect
tribes, it had the ultimate authority to declare that it had never
divested tribes of the authority to prosecute non-member Indian of-
fenders, presumably a function consistent with protecting tribeslS9
and with the tribes' inherent right to protect themselves. 9 0
In contrast to Duro, the Court previously distinguished tribal au-
thority over members, indicating that tribes' sovereign power to prose-
cute members for tribal offenses "clearly does not fall within that part
of sovereignty which the Indians implicitly lost by virtue of their de-
pendent status," and was "attributable in no way to any delegation to
them of federal authority."19l In Wheeler, the Court viewed federal
statutes that explicitly excluded or did not mention crimes committed
by Indians against other Indians as recognition of inherent tribal ju-
risdiction over members.19 2 The same rationale should support inher-
ent tribal jurisdiction over non-member Indians because the statutes
relied upon do not distinguish tribal jurisdiction over Indians who are
tribal members from non-member Indians.19 3 The Court found that
186. See id. at 824.
187. See 435 U.S. at 210 (emphasis added).
188. See Duro, 495 U.S. at 686-88.
189. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
190. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1980); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
191. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326, 328 (1978).
192. See id. at 324-25.
193. But see Duro, 495 U.S. at 689-90 ("[The] historical argument [based] upon evi-
dence that definitions of 'Indian' in federal statutes and programs apply to all
Indians without respect to membership in a particular tribe .... [is] not disposi-
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federal laws that authorized tribes to adopt constitutions to facilitate
their self-government did not create Indians' power to govern them-
selves or their right to punish tribal criminal offenders.' 9 4 Therefore,
under the dual sovereignty doctrine, the Double Jeopardy Clause did
not bar federal prosecution of a tribal member subsequent to tribal
prosecution.' 9 5
However, the Duro Court determined that federal statutes not dis-
tinguishing members from non-members was not dispositive evidence
of inherent tribal jurisdiction over all Indians. Still, the Duro Court's
bases for determining that tribes did not retain inherent sovereignty
sufficient to prosecute non-member criminal offenders-consent to
statutes establishing tribal courts and constitutions, prior treaties,
and scholarly articles-are not constitutionally dispositive of lack of
inherent jurisdiction over non-members.' 96
Furthermore, in Wheeler the Court rejected the request to limit the
dual sovereignty restrictions on double jeopardy to successive state
and federal prosecutions because of pragmatic policy considera-
tions.' 97 The Court reasoned that tribal members could very easily be
motivated to quickly plead to tribal charges, for which penalties are
limited by federal statute, to avoid much more severe penalties under
federal prosecution.198 Those same pragmatic concerns would have
applied if the Panel majority's holding that jurisdiction over non-mem-
ber Indians is not inherent and therefore arises under the same sover-
eignty as do federal prosecutions would have stood. The policy
analysis supporting Wheeler implies that, in general, tribal criminal
jurisdiction is not rooted in constitutional footings.
The Duro Court and the Panel majority in Weaselhead were con-
cerned with Bill of Rights protections not applying to those who come
before tribal courts.' 99 In Talton v. Mayes, the Court declared that
despite being subject to the ultimate legislative authority of Congress,
tribes' powers of self-government, including their authority to prose-
cute crimes, did not spring from the Constitution because tribes en-
tive of a question of tribal power to treat Indians by the same broad
classification.").
194. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 328. The federal statutes to which the Court refers are
those that repudiated allotment and assimilation policies and sought to reorgan-
ize tribal governments. See Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, § 1, 48
Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §461 (1994)); ch. 576, § 16, 48 Stat.
987 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1994)).
195. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 329-30 (construing Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376
(1896)).
196. See 495 U.S. at 690.
197. See 435 U.S. at 330-31.
198. See id.
199. See Duro, 495 U.S. at 693; United States v. Weaselhead, 156 F.3d 818, 822 (8th
Cir. 1998), reh'g granted and opinion vacated, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 30874, at *1
(8th Cir. Dec. 4, 1998).
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joyed those powers prior to the adoption of the Constitution. 20 0 The
Talton Court reiterated rationale from Kagama, stating that "'Indians
... were and always have been, regarded as having a semi-independ-
ent position ... not as states .... but as a separate people, with the
power of regulating their internal and social relations ....'"201
Although the Duro Court attempted to distinguish members from
non-member Indians by the former's consent, it ignored the language
the Talton Court highlighted. If tribal jurisdiction extended only to
members, the Duro Court had to interpret "internal" and "social rela-
tions" as mere tautology. However, the most applicable definition of
"social" is "living or disposed to live in companionship with others in a
community, rather than in isolation," or "of or pertaining to the life,
welfare, and relations of human beings in a community."20 2 "Inter-
nal," in contrast, would ostensibly refer to members. In its determina-
tion that the Bill of Rights did not apply to tribal courts, the Talton
Court apparently did not limit inherent tribal jurisdiction to tribal
members. Apart from the Duro Court's assertion that federal statutes
not distinguishing between members and non-members was not dis-
positive of tribes' inherent jurisdiction, the Court's own precedent
should, at a minimum, illustrate the lack of constitutional instruction
on the matter.
Still, Congress addressed concerns regarding unfettered tribal au-
thority by enacting the Indian Civil Rights Act.203 One must question
the solemnity of the Supreme Court's concerns regarding "serious...
intrusion[s] on personal liberty"204 in light of the fact that it has con-
strued the protections of the Indian Civil Rights Act as narrowly as
possible. 20 5 In Duro, the Court acknowledged that all Indians were
made citizens in 1924.206 However, the Court failed to point out that
Indians were made citizens only by statute.20 7 Congress, and not the
200. 163 U.S. 376, 385 (1896).
201. Id. at 384 (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886)).
202. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY, supra note 129, at 1270.
203. Act of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1994).
204. Duro, 495 U.S. at 693.
205. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71 (1978) (limiting federal fo-
rums for Indian Civil Rights claims); see also McCurdy v. Steele, 506 F.2d 653,
656 (10th Cir. 1974) (finding that despite no specific tribal agency to hear a con-
troversy related to tribal elections, an Indian Civil Rights Act violation was first
to be analyzed by the Council alleged to have committed the violation before it
could be reviewed by a federal court); Conroy v. Frizzell, 429 F. Supp. 918, 925
(D.S.D. 1977) (stating that the court has "neither the inclination nor the power to
review or overturn [a tribal court's] determination by forcing concepts of Anglo-
American law upon the Tribe").
206. See 495 U.S. at 692.
207. See Citizenship Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 175, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (current ver-
sion at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b)(1994)) (naturalizing all "Indians born within the terri-
torial limits of the United States"). Previously, courts had held that the
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Court, should have the last word on what that statute entails, as dis-
comforting as that premise might seem in some contexts.
Previously, in reference to the Pueblo Indians, who held their lands
in fee and were not part of a reservation, the Court held that "citizen-
ship is not in itself an obstacle to the exercise by Congress of its power
to enact laws for the benefit and protection of tribal Indians as a de-
pendent people."208 In shamefully paternalistic terms, the Court indi-
cated that:
Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate com-
merce with the Indian tribes, but long continued legislative and executive us-
age and an unbroken current of judicial decisions have attributed to the
United States as a superior and civilized nation the power and the duty of
exercising a fostering care and protection over all dependent Indian communi-
ties ... within or without the limits of a state.
2 0 9
Historical precedent indicates that the Constitution did not limit Con-
gress to protecting Indians according to their tribal membership. Os-
tensibly, the Sandoval Court considered Congress's constitutional
commerce authority as distinctly separate from judicial interpretation
of legislative and executive infringements on tribal sovereignty in
noncommerce areas. The latter can only be based on common law
interpretation.
The Duro Court and the Panel majority in Weaselhead also re-
ferred to constitutional limitations on Congress's political powers. 210
In Reid v. Covert, the Court refused to allow Congress or the Executive
branch to exercise political powers in such a way that deprived indi-
viduals of their constitutional protections.21 In that case, an execu-
tive agreement between the United States and Great Britain
permitted military courts of the United States to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over offenses committed in Great Britain by dependents of
military servicemen. The military courts did not extend Bill of Rights
protections to such non-military dependents. The Court stated that
"no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Con-
gress, or on any other branch of Government, which is free from the
restraints of the Constitution. 212 However, had the agreement not
been made, Congress or the Executive branch certainly could not have
Fourteenth Amendment's grant of citizenship to persons born or naturalized in
the United States did not include Indians and they were therefore not subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States. See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884);
McKay v. Campbell, 16 F. Cas. 161, 166 (D. Or. 1871) (No. 8839); see also United
States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913) (leaving question of citizenship open).
208. Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 48.
209. Id. at 45-46 (emphasis added).
210. See Duro, 495 U.S. at 693-94 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)); United
States v. Weaselhead, 156 F.3d 818, 824 & n.5 (8th Cir. 1998), rehg granted and
opinion vacated, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 30874, at *1 (8th Cir. Dec. 4, 1998).
211. 354 U.S. 1.
212. Id. at 16.
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unilaterally deprived the government of Great Britain of its jurisdic-
tion. Nor could the Court have insisted that United States constitu-
tional protections be extended to Great Britain's prosecution of an
individual. Congress's treaties with Great Britain, or lack thereof,
would not determine that Great Britain is no longer a sovereign na-
tion. Similarly, in the absence of congressional action depriving tribes
of their inherent jurisdiction, the Court cannot extend constitutional
protections to those subject to tribal jurisdiction. Nor can the Court
extend those protections if Congress has simply returned jurisdiction
to the tribes, much like the effect of revoking treaties with foreign
countries.
The Marshall Court determined in Cherokee Nation that Indian
tribes are not foreign nations for the purpose of extending the Court's
original jurisdiction to protect tribes. It is Congress's and not the
Court's role to determine the extent to which power is taken from
tribes.213 Although Congress could unilaterally act to deprive tribes
of their criminal jurisdiction over non-members, it has not done so.
Quite to the contrary, as the district court pointed out in Weaselhead,
Congress has affirmed that it has not taken certain aspects of tribal
sovereignty. The Court has found that Congress did not intend to ex-
tend a federal forum to those claiming tribal governments' violations
of the Indian Civil Rights Act.214 Similarly, the Court is without au-
thority to unilaterally extend the protections of the United States
Constitution to individuals who are before tribal courts when Con-
gress has not exercised its political power to deprive tribes of their
inherent jurisdiction.
In United States v. Lopez2 15 and Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Flor-
ida,2 1 6 the Court declared constitutional limitations on Congress's
power to regulate under the Commerce Clause. However, Congress
did not exercise its commerce powers in affirming tribes' inherent
criminal jurisdiction over non-members. It is simply exercising its fi-
duciary responsibility in affirming that it had not divested the tribe of
its prosecuting authority. In interpreting limitations on Congress's
power to infringe on state sovereignty, the Court can look to the Tenth
and Eleventh Amendments 2 17 for guidance and substantiation. How-
ever, the Court has no analogous basis for determining the inherent
boundaries of tribal sovereignty or Congress's extra-constitutional re-
sponsibility to protect tribes or tribal members. Although the Panel
majority in Weaselhead cited Seminole Tribe as establishing limits on
congressional power, in Seminole Tribe the Court was interpreting the
213. See CoHEN, supra note 38, at 122.
214. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71 (1978).
215. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
216. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
217. U.S. CONST. amend. X; U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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scope of Congress's authority under the Indian Commerce Clause.
Congress's authority as it relates to tribal criminal jurisdiction has no
comparable constitutional basis.
IV. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
AVOIDED BY VACATING THE PANEL'S DECISION
The most obvious practical effect the decision of the United States
v. Weaselhead Panel majority would have had was that the fears ex-
pressed in Abbate v. United States,2 is Bartkus v. Illinois,29 and
United States v. Wheeler2 20 would have come to fruition. In
Weaselhead, a non-member Indian would have only been subject to
minimal punishment for relatively serious crimes perpetrated on a
young Winnebago tribal member. Through their own constitutions
modeled after the federal Constitution, tribes have implemented pro-
tections of the rights of those who come before tribal courts. For in-
stance, the Omaha Tribe requires that those individuals detained for
crimes be charged and arraigned within a limited number of hours
after arrest or be released. 221 Federal prosecutors who are not located
on reservations may have neither the time nor desire to assert juris-
218. 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
219. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
220. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
221. TRmAL R. Cmr. P. tit. II, Gen. Provisions, Rule 5(j); tit. III, Provisions Gov't
Crim. Proceeding, Rule 23(a), (c) (Omaha Tribe of Neb.). Rule 5(j) states:
The right to be released on bail as provided herein shall not accrue
until charges under this Code shall have been filed. Persons incarcerated
in the Tribal jail for violation of the federal and state laws shall be sub-
ject to be released on bail by the jurisdiction under whose authority the
arrest was made according to the provisions of the laws under which
their arrest was made. A person arrested for violation of federal law
shall not be entitled to be released on bail until the prosecution of such
charges has been declined by the U.S. Attorney, plus a reasonable time
thereafter, not to exceed 36 hours after receipt of notification of such
declination, in which charges for violation of this Code, if any, may be
filed, provided that upon the arrest of any person solely for violation of
federal law, custody of the arrested party shall immediately be given to
the appropriate federal authorities. Unless such authorities accept cus-
tody of the defendant and make arrangements with the Chief of Police to
physically remove the arrested party from the Tribal jail, or to pay the
Tribal jail to hold said party as Federal prisoners, the Chief of Police
shall release said party from custody upon 24 hours notice to the appro-
priate U.S. Attorney and to the Tribal prosecutor if no tribal charges
have been filed as of that time.
Id.
Rule 23 states:
(a) As soon as reasonably possible after arrest but not more than 36
hours thereafter, or within the period designated on the summons
whichever is the lesser, the defendant shall appear or be brought before
a Tribal judge, and the defendant shall be informed of his right to coun-
sel and of his right to bail.
1999]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
diction within that timeframe. In Weaselhead, before federal grand
jury indictments could be issued, the defendant entered a plea and the
tribal court rendered judgment. 222 Tribal prosecutors would therefore
be faced with the untenable decision of releasing dangerous non-mem-
ber Indian offenders without charging them, thus leaving them free to
abscond or perpetrate again, or charging them and risking quick pleas
to tribal charges subject only to statutorily limited punishment. Had
the Weaselhead Panel majority's decision stood, the latter choice
would have barred subsequent prosecution by the federal government.
Because tribal punishment is limited by federal statute, non-member
Indians who rape or murder tribal members or non-member Indians
on Indian reservations and quickly plea to a tribal charge could feasi-
bly have gotten away with one year's imprisonment and a $5000
fine. 2 2 3
In Duro, the Court stated that its "decision... [did] not imply en-
dorsement of the theory of a jurisdictional void... "224 Furthermore,
the Court challenged policy criticisms by stating that if the jurisdic-
tional scheme was "insufficient to meet the practical needs of reserva-
tion law enforcement, then the proper body to address the problem is
Congress, which has the ultimate authority over Indian affairs." 225
Congress met that challenge with its post-Duro revision, which was
designed to elucidate judicial misperceptions and affirm inherent
prosecutorial sovereignty over non-member Indians, thereby remedy-
ing perceived jurisdictional voids. However, to hold that Duro
grounded inherent sovereignty in the Constitution would have made it
impossible to both cure jurisdictional voids and prevent double jeop-
ardy bars on federal prosecutions of serious offenses committed by
non-member Indians.
One option would have been to pass federal legislation giving fed-
eral prosecutors the authority to prosecute non-member Indian offend-
ers for all crimes, including misdemeanors, committed on
reservations. However, as it is, at least some federal prosecutors
choose not to prosecute felonies under the Major Crimes Act unless it
appears convictions will be readily obtained.2 2 6 Federal prosecutors
based long distances from reservations would not be likely to expend
the resources necessary to prosecute serious or minor misdemeanors.
(c) At the time of the arraignment, the criminal complaint will be
read to the defendant, and the defendant will be asked to enter a plea.
Id.
222. See United States v. Weaselhead, 156 F.3d 818, 819(8th Cir. 1998), reh'g granted
and opinion vacated, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 30874, at *1 (8th Cir. Dec. 4, 1998).
223. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1994).
224. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 697 (1990).
225. Id. at 698.




Another option, as the Court suggested in Duro, would have been
for tribes to consent to state jurisdiction under Public Law 280, so that
states could "assist in maintaining order on the reservation by punish-
ing minor crime."2 27 However, that option would have created the
very double jeopardy issue the Weaselhead Panel majority and the
Duro Court itself sought to avoid. Because states do not possess in-
herent authority to prosecute Indian offenders on tribal lands, they
may only prosecute pursuant to a congressional delegation of author-
ity, such as Public Law 280. Consequently, if a state prosecutor would
choose to prosecute minor crimes committed by non-members on a res-
ervation, her authority to do so would emanate from the same source
as the authority for federal prosecution. Therefore, state prosecution
of a minor crime would bar subsequent prosecution of any related
felony.
This suggestion also ignores a lurid history of tribal-state rela-
tions. As the Court in Duro noted, "Isitate authorities may lack the
power, resources, or inclination to deal with reservation crime."2 28
Also, citizens in areas surrounding reservations may create environ-
ments unfavorable to states expending resources to prosecute crimes
committed on reservations. Disturbing illustrations of non-Indian
community pressures abound. For instance, an 18-year old Indian wo-
man was beaten, raped, and shot five times in her head and back, near
her home on the Standing Rock Indian Reservation abutting
Mobridge, South Dakota. Although the murderers had attended a
party with the victim earlier on the night of the incident, they were
not arrested until fourteen years after the murder when the ex-wife of
one of the non-Indian Mobridge offenders apprised authorities of her
former spouse's involvement. Subsequently, more than a hundred
Mobridge citizens signed a petition to lower one suspect's bond, in-
cluding the priest of the Catholic Church attended by families of both
the suspect and the victim. 2 2 9
In United States v. Weaselhead, the Panel majority's conclusion
that certain modern Supreme Court cases were based on the Court's
interpretation of the Constitution, and not on its interpretation of the
common law, would have designated the Supreme Court as the au-
thoritative body for determining the substance of Indian tribes' re-
227. See Duro, 495 U.S. at 697.
228. Id.
229. See Brian Bonner, Racial Tensions Flare in the Heat of 16-year-old Murder Inves-
tigation, BUFF. NEWS, March 3, 1996, at A10. The primary perpetrator pled
guilty to manslaughter in 1996. See Brian Bonner, Man Pleads Guilty to 1980
Murder of Sioux Teen, BuFF. NEws, May 8, 1996, at A4; see also Field, supra note
4, at 22 ("If the original purpose of federal plenary and exclusive authority over
Indian affairs is the perceived inability of states to deal fairly with Indian tribes,
it seems perverse to require enforcement of Indian rights in state court.").
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tained sovereignty.230 In so doing, the Panel majority would have
substituted the Court for Congress as the ultimate policymaking au-
thority for Indian affairs. Although Congress is responsible for pro-
tecting tribes, it would have been limited in its ability to carry out its
fiduciary duties to those means reconcilable with the Court's policy
preferences. Because the Court has insisted on focusing on policy of
the allotment era, Congress's policy of self-determination for Indian
tribes would have been permanently usurped. Furthermore, any con-
gressional attempt to rectify past harms and return to tribes those
aspects of inherent sovereignty previously divested would have been
subject to judicial scrutiny.
Perhaps the most devastating implication on many levels would
have been tribes' lack of ability to protect their own members from
crimes committed by non-member Indians. If Congress could only al-
leviate potential double jeopardy issues by divesting tribes ofjurisdic-
tion over non-member Indians, tribes would lack the power to shape,
empower, and protect their communities. Families residing on reser-
vations include tribal members and non-members. Many tribes em-
ploy non-member Indians on reservations. When tribal jurisdiction is
juxtaposed with state or federal jurisdiction, the impracticalities of
the Panel majority's vacated decision become crystal clear. A world
wherein a state could not prosecute any offender who was not a citizen
because the offender had no right to participate in the state's govern-
ment is incomprehensible. 23 1 Further, foreign offenders, such as the
convicted bombers of the World Trade Center, are not exempt from
federal prosecution simply because our courts observe customs that
are strange and unknown to them.232
Concerns implying the strange practices of tribal courts are un-
founded in light of the fact that tribal governments, courts, and consti-
tutions were modeled after those of the United States and are
required to be approved by the Secretary of the Interior.2 33 In addi-
tion, the Indian Civil Rights Act extends most of the Bill of Rights
protections to offenders who appear before tribal courts. To the same
extent non-Indian communities expect their governments to vindicate
230. See 156 F.3d 818(8th Cir. 1998), reh'g granted and opinion vacated, 1998 U.S.
App. LEXIS 30874, at *1 (8th Cir. Dec. 4, 1998).
231. But see Duro, 495 U.S. at 694 ("[Tribes' broad freedom was] all the more reason to
reject an extension of tribal authority over those who have not given the consent
of the governed that provides a fundamental basis for power within our constitu-
tional system.").
232. But see id. at 693 ("While modern tribal courts include many familiar features of
the judicial process, they are influenced by the unique customs, languages, and
usages of the tribes they serve. Tribal courts[] ... legal methods may depend on
'unspoken practices and norms.'" (quoting COHEN, supra note 38, at 334-35)).
233. See Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1994).
[Vol. 78:162
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
wrongs perpetrated upon them, tribal communities should be able to
expect their governments to protect them.
V. CONCLUSION
The Eighth Circuit Panel's vacated decision in United States v.
Weaselhead was based on a flawed assumption that the Court has a
constitutional basis for determining the inherent sovereignty with
which tribes began or the extent of tribes' retained inherent sover-
eignty. In Duro, the Court could only have based its decision on the
common law. The Duro Court did not base its decision on the Consti-
tution because all congressional enactments regarding Indian affairs
are either extra-constitutional or based on the Indian Commerce
Clause, which does not speak to tribes' criminal jurisdiction. Also, the
Court's fiction of implicit divestiture was based on the "actual state of
things" and the law of nations in order to justify congressional usurpa-
tion of tribes' inherent sovereignty. Implicit divestiture is not the
product of constitutional guidance. Had there been a constitutional
basis for tribal sovereignty, tribes would have had more protection
from majority infidngements carried out by congressional policies and
enactments throughout the country's history. Because early in the
history of federal Indian law the Court declared there were no consti-
tutional limitations on congressional authority over tribes' sovereign
powers, Congress relied on such declarations in divesting those pow-
ers. Congress should not now be limited in defining what it has not
taken or what it chooses to restore. If courts now determine that there
is a constitutional basis for tribal sovereignty, or divestment thereof,
the lack of constitutional protections for tribes in the past would be
inexplicable.
If the Court should choose to ground limitations on Congress's fidu-
ciary authority in Congress's constitutional war and treaty powers, it
should also revisit the constitutionality of allowing the House to limit
the Senate and Executive's treaty powers by virtue of a rider, from
which the unconstrained plenary powers doctrine arose.23 4 Should
that doctrine fail, manifestations of Congress's allotment policy must
also fail.
Now is not the time for the Court to discover a constitutional basis
for tribal sovereignty. Finding that the Court has ascertained tribe's
positions within our constitutional structure would have precluded
Congress from repairing harms perpetrated upon Indian tribes during
less enlightened eras and would have bound Congress to policies of the
past. A constitutional foundation for tribal sovereignty would prevent
Congresses of the future from improving Indian affairs and empower-
ing tribal communities. Despite the modern Supreme Court's focus on
234. See Deloria & Newton, supra note 7, at 74.
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non-tribal interests, the actual state of things requires that Congress
be allowed to affirm or return those aspects of inherent tribal sover-
eignty that are necessary to allow tribal governments to protect their
communities and make those communities whole.
As the District Court of the District of Nebraska indicated, Con-
gress merely affirmed tribes' inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-
member Indians. Finding that tribes' criminal jurisdiction is inherent
is essential to prevent jurisdictional voids and double jeopardy bars on
more substantial federal prosecutions. Unlike Congress taking land
promised to tribes by treaties under the pretense of its fiduciary du-
ties, Congress should be able to exercise its duty to legitimately pro-
tect tribes free of the Court's agenda. By vacating the Panel majority's
decision and affirming that of the district court, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals left the door open for Congress to make amends for
the past and to avert further devastation to tribal communities.
Although modern Supreme Court decisions have obscured the ability
of courts and Congress to acknowledge and protect tribal sovereignty
and communities, the path is made clear by history.
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